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ABSTRACT
This research examines the organizational performance
implications of relative wage strategies and pay
structures. Organizations' relative wage strategies and pay
structures are key characteristics useful in describing and
delimiting various compensation systems, and are therefore
particularly relevant for evaluation at the organizational
level. The organizational performance implications of
organizations' relative wage strategies and pay structures
are investigated in terms of both operational and financial
indicators of organizational performance. Initially,
relevant theory and past research on relative wage
strategies and pay structures are discussed. Following
this, hypotheses are developed that predict the operational
and financial performance implications of pay structures
and relative wage rates. Next, the sample and research
methodology used to investigate the research hypotheses are
presented. Results indicate that relative wage practices
and pay structures influence measures of organizational
performance. Moreover, results also show that relative wage
practice and pay structures interact to influence the
operational and financial measures of organizational
performance. The research concludes with a discussion of
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the results, their limitations, and suggestions for future
research.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE DISSERTATION TOPIC
Research investigating the strategic implications of
human resource management (HRM) practices has found that
firms' HRM practices have significant implications for
organizational performance (Arthur, 1992; Arthur, 1994;
Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Becker & Huselid, 1988; Huselid,
1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994; Terpestra & Rozell,
1993; Wright, McMahan & McWilliams, 1994; Wright & McMahan,
1992). This research includes evidence of HRM's effects on
both

operational indicators of organizational performance

(e.g., scrap rates, product quality, productivity)(CutcherGershenfeld,

1991; Huselid,

1995; MacDuffie,

1995; Youndt,

Snell, Dean & Lepak; 1996) and financial measures of
performance (e.g. profit, return on assets)(Becker &
Huselid, 1998; Cutcher-Gershenfeld,

1991; Delery & Doty,

1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Welbourne & Andrews,
1996). Of particular note, compensation systems have been
shown to play a major role in human resource practices'
affects on organizational level results (Becker & Huselid,
1998). Becker and Huselid (1996) found that an increase in
managers 1 monetary compensation by one standard deviation
is associated with 19% higher market values and 27% higher
accounting profits. Research has also found that the use of
performance-based contingent compensation practices, such

1
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as bonuses, are associated with organizations' financial
performance

(e.g. Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Similarly,

incentive based compensation practices, such as those that
focus on service quality, have been shown to relate to
operational performance (e.g. Banker, Lee, Potter &
Srinivasan,

1996).

A sufficient body of research on compensation
practices has thus emerged, illustrating the sizable role
that compensation systems play in determining
organizational performance (e.g., Becker & Gerhart, 1996);
however, the body of research investigating compensation
practices'

influence on organizational performance is

relatively new. Furthermore, considering the importance and
complexities of compensation issues, more research on the
organizational performance implications of such practices
is still needed (Becker & Gerhart, 1996).

In particular,

research addressing the organizational performance
implications of specific compensation practices is
pertinent

(Becker & Huselid, 1998; Gerhart & Milkovich,

1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Gerhart, Trevor & Graham,
1996).

This research will address the impact of

organizational level compensation practices on
organizational performance. Specifically, it will address
the question: How do compensation practices affect

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

operational and financial indicators of organizational
performance?
Compensation Research
While there has been substantial micro level
compensation research investigating compensation practices'
relationship with a host of individual level issues
including employees' attraction, retention, turnover,
absenteeism, participation in union activities, and
individual job performance (e.g., Ehrenberg & Smith, 1988;
Heneman, 1985; Milkovich & Newman, 1990; Rynes & Barber,
1990) there is only limited research considering
compensation practices' impact on organizational level
(i.e., macro) variables

(Gerhart et al., 1996; Gerhart &

Milkovich, 1990; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992) . Notable
exceptions include research investigating the impact of
several compensation practices' on organizations' staffing
levels

(e.g., Lineneman, Wachter, & Carter,

on investments
performance

1990), return

(e.g., Raff & Summers, 1987), and

(e.g., Banker et a l ., 1996). However, only

limited individual, and little simultaneous attention
(i.e., multiple practices investigated at the same time)
has been given to the performance implications of key
aspects of compensation systems such as their relative wage
levels and pay structures (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Bloom &

3
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Milkovich, 1998; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman, 1999) . This gap in
macro compensation research is noteworthy because these
compensation practices are critical to developing,
implementing, and maintaining a compensation plan. They are
thus likely to affect important organizational outcomes,
and are inexorably linked to organizations' successes or
failures

(Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman,

1999). Furthermore, because relative wage levels and pay
structures are readily comparable across organizations, and
are useful in describing and delimiting various
compensation systems, they are particularly relevant for
evaluation at the organizational level (Gerhart &
Milkovich,

1992; Milkovich & Newman, 1999). Thus, this

research will consider the effects of both pay structures
and relative wage levels at the organizational level.
Pav Level. Pay Structures, and Relevant Theory
Relative wage level represents a firm's average
compensation level relative to the wages paid by other
competing organizations (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).
Relative wage rates are often expressed as either leading,
matching, or lagging the market (Milkovich & Newman,

1999) .

Pay structures describe the array of pay rates within
organizations. Defining characteristics of particular pay

4
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structures include the number of levels in the structure,
the size of the pay differentials between each level in the
structure, and the rate that employees may progress through
each level in the structure (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).
Pay structures can be described as the degree to which
organizations' compensation systems are either egalitarian
or hierarchical. Compensation systems are more egalitarian
(i.e. less hierarchical) to the extent that their pay
structures have fewer levels and compressed pay
distributions

(Bloom, 1999; Gerhart & Milkovich,

1992). In

hierarchical structures, pay distributions have more levels
over which pay is more widely dispersed (Bloom, 1999) .
While many theoretical perspectives can be employed in
investigating the performance implications of relative wage
strategies

(e.g., compensating differentials theory,

efficiency wage theory, signaling theory, reservation wage
theory, job competition theory) and pay structures

(e.g.,

expectancy theory, human capital theory, equity theory,
tournament theory), efficiency wage theory and equity
theory have been most widely applied to gain insights into
their strategic implications in organizational settings
(Becker, 1975; Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1992; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1996; Klaas &
McClendon, 1996; Krefting, 1980; Krefting & Mahoney, 1977;

5
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Lawler,

1990; Lawler, 1994; Milkovich & Newman, 1999;

O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1993; Tsang, 1987).
Efficiency wage theory suggests several mechanisms
whereby relative wage strategies may influence employee
performance, and therefore, organizational performance
(Akerlof & Yellen, 1986; Boudreau & Berger,

1985; Klaas &

McClendon, 1996). Conversely, equity theory is helpful in
explaining why organizational performance may either
increase or decrease as pay structures become more or less
hierarchical

(Bloom, 1999; Cropanzano & Greenberg,

1997;

Eriksson, 1999; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Main et al., 1993;
Vroom, 1964). In this research, I will use these approache
to investigate relative wage strategies and pay structures
implications for organizations' performance.
Significance of the Dissertation
Authors of theoretical research agree that both
relative wage rates and pay structures are important;
however, empirical research has largely been absent on the
performance implications of various relative wage
strategies and pay structures either singularly or in
unison (Bloom, 1999; Klaas & McClendon,

1996).

Accordingly, the focus of this research will be on the
implications for operational and financial indicators of
organizational performance. Operational and financial

6
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indicators are being used because a complete understanding
of relative wage strategies and pay structures' effects on
organizational performance requires a consideration of
their impact in these areas (Boudreau & Berger, 1985;
Boudreau, Sturman, Trevor, & Gerhart, 1999; Klaas &
McClendon,

1996; Venkatraman & Ramanujam,

1986).

From a research perspective, this study should be
useful in understanding the organizational performance
effects of organizational level compensation practices.
This is consistent with the increased interest in the
research literature in understanding the strategic
implications of HRM practices

(Becker & Gerhart,

1996).

Practically, these are important areas for research because
organizations ultimately choose pay structures and relative
wage rates to influence organizational success

(Bloom,

1999) . In this respect, increased knowledge of relative
wage rates and pay structures is particularly important in
an era in which organizational responses to heightened
competitive pressures frequently include pay level and pay
structure policy changes (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Gerhart
& Milkovich, 1992; Klaas & McClendon, 1996, Lawler, 1990;
Lawler,

1994; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993).

7
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Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two
presents the relevant theory and literature that serve as a
basis for the dissertation. It also presents the hypotheses
to be investigated in the dissertation. Chapter three
presents the dissertation's methods. This includes a
discussion of the dissertation's sample, its measures,
control variables, and the proposed analytical technique.
Results will be presented in chapter four. Chapter five
discusses the dissertation's results, its limitations, and
directions for future research.

8
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Relative Wage Practices
Effects of Relative Wage Strategies on Operational
Indicators of Organizational Performance
Employee efficiency is the primary mechanism through
which relative wage practices influence operational
measures of organizational performance (e.g., productivity
in units per labor hour)

(Akerlof & Yellen, 1986; Kim,

1998; Rebitzer & Taylor,

1995). How these effects may

manifest themselves can be understood by examining
predictions from efficiency wage theory.
According to efficiency wage theory, high relative
wages improve employee and organizational efficiency
because firms that offer high relative wages can attract
and retain highly qualified job candidates (Akerlof &
Yellen,

1984; Campbell,

1993; Yellen, 1984; Weiss, 1988).

High relative wages also generate large applicant pools
which allow organizations to be more selective when hiring
(Boudreau, 1992; Boudreau & Rynes,1985; Raff & Summers,
1987; Williams & Dreher,

1992). Because organizations are

more able to hire the most capable employees, those that
pay high relative wages experience increases in both
employee and organizational efficiency. Therefore, the
ability to attract and retain better employees due to high
relative wages will positively influence operational
9
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indicators of organizational performance (Becker & Huselid,
1998; Boudreau & Rynes, 1985; Campbell, 1993; Hunter &
Hunter, 1984; Williams & Dreher, 1992). Illustrating this,
Raff and Summers (1987) have included this perspective as
one explanation for Henry Ford's 1914 decision to pay
employees above market wages. Specifically, even though
Raff and Summers (1987) discount this perspective's
applicability to the situation at Ford, they do note its
effectiveness in increasing Ford's employee attraction and
retention.
Efficiency wage theory also suggests that high
relative wages improve employee and organizational
efficiency by decreasing employees’ unproductive or
shirking behavior (Akerlof & Yellen, 1984). These effects
may be particularly important when employees' job
performance is costly and/or difficult to monitor (Capelli
& Chauvin,

1991; Rebitzer & Taylor, 1995; Walsh, 1999).

Indeed, when relative wages are high, employees who shirk
will suffer personal economic costs from involuntary
turnover (Akerlof & Yellen, 1984).

Personal costs result

because employees who are fired may have a di fficult time
finding other jobs with similarly high wages

(Akerlof &

Yellen, 1984; Capelli & Chauvin, 1991). Illustrating this,
Cappelli and Chauvin (1991) found low levels of shirking

10
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and shirking related disciplinary problems when wage rates
were high.
Although not considered part of efficiency wage
theory, Lazear (1979) has used a similar explanation to
demonstrate why employees might be compensated lower than
their marginal productivity (i.e., the value of their
organizational contributions) early in their careers and
higher than their marginal productivity later in their
careers. Delayed compensation, as this is called, is
attributed to the positive employee agency effects

(i.e.,

employees acting in the best interest of their
organizations) associated with these increasing wage
profiles. The prospects of higher wages (i.e., efficiency
wages) keep employees motivated and focused on tasks at
hand and discourage unproductive activities. Prospective
future higher wages are motivational because employees
realize that current poor performance will eliminate their
opportunities to receive higher wages in the future.
Norm-gift exchange models provide another efficiency
wage theory based explanation for relative wage practices'
effects on employee and organizational efficiency (Akerlof
1982; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). Norm-gift exchange model
assert that, as a consequence of employee-firm exchanges,
employees acquire sentiments for their firms and feel

11
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obliged to maintain equity in these exchanges

(Akerlof,

1982; Cropanzano & Greenberg,1997; Gerhart & Milkovich,
1992; Yellen, 1984).

Therefore, when inequity occurs in

these exchanges, employees seek to return the relationship
to a state of equity (Adams, 1963; Akerlof,

1982;

Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Festinger, 1954; Gerhart &
Milkovich,

1992; Yellen, 1984). Accordingly, one

explanation for high relative wages' positive influence is
that they create a disequilibrium in the employee-firm
relationship resulting in increases in employee effort and
efficiency (Adams, 1963; Akerlof,
Greenberg,

1982; Cropanzano &

1998; Festinger, 1954; Gerhart & Milkovich,

1992; Akerlof,

1984). Yellen (1984), describes this as

firms paying "workers a gift of wages in excess of the
minimum required, in return for their (workers) gift of
effort above the minimum required."

(p.204)

To summarize, each of these explanations based on
efficiency wage theory suggests that high relative wages
will positively contribute to increased employee and
organizational efficiency.
Hypothesis 1. Organizations' relative wage levels will
be positively related to operational indicators of
organizational performance.

12
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Effects of Relative Wage Strategies on Financial Indicators
of Organizational Performance
The effects of relative wage strategies on financial
indicators of organizational performance are more complex
than their effects on operational indicators of
organizational performance. Financial indicators of
organizational performance, such as return on assets

(ROA)

or profit margin, reflect organizations' fulfillment of
their economic goals, and focus on both the efficiency
benefits and costs of relative wage strategies
& Ramanujam,

(Venkatraman

1996). Costs of relative wage strategies

primarily reflect the pay associated with pursuing a
particular relative wage strategy. Costs of relative wage
strategies vary because the pay associated with each
strategy varies. Importantly, the efficiency benefits of
relative wage strategies also vary. Thus, depending upon
the specific circumstances, more costly relative wage
strategies may yield efficiency benefits which either
exceed or fall short of their costs. Moreover, the effects
of relative wage strategies on financial indicators of
performance depend upon the difference between the
strategies' costs and their efficiency benefits (Walsh,
1999) .
Considered from the perspective of financial
indicators of performance, optimal relative wage strategies
13
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are those which maximize the differential between their
costs and benefits.

As relative wage strategies move from

lagging to leading market wages, both their costs and
efficiency benefits increase.

Initially, efficiency wage

theory would suggest that greater relative wage levels'
efficiency benefits outweigh their associated costs. Thus,
financial indicators of organizational performance are
positively influenced. However, there are likely to be
limits on potential efficiency gains, such as those due to
limits in individual ability, the circumstances of work
(e.g., equipment limitation), and/or the opportunity to
perform (Blumberg & Pringle, 1982; Peters & O'Connor,
1980). Therefore, at some point, the efficiency benefits of
higher relative wages likely cease to outweigh their costs
and financial indicators of organizational performance are
adversely influenced. This suggests the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. An inverted U-shaped relation exists
between organizational level relative wage strategies
and financial indicators of organizational
performance.
Pay Structures
In addition to relative wage practices, pay structures
may also influence organizations' performance (Bloom, 1999;

14
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Bloom & Michael, in press). Pay structures' effects on
organizational performance have received less attention
than relative wage practices. One explanation for this is
that pay structures present researchers with what at first
appears to be a paradoxical situation in that prior
research provides very dissimilar descriptive statements
regarding pay structures1 impact on individual and
organizational performance (Bloom, 1999). Specifically,
some suggest positive consequences as pay structures become
more hierarchical

(e.g Becker & Huselid, 1992; Ehrenberg &

Bognanno, 1990; Eriksson, 1999; Knoeber & Thurman,
Krefting & Mahoney, 1977; Krefting,

1994;

1980; Lazear & Rosen,

1981; Main et ai., 1993), while others suggest negative
consequences as pay structures become more hierarchical
(e.g., Bloom, 1999; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). In short,
research has suggested that both hierarchical and
egalitarian pay structures are useful. To clarify these
seemingly inconsistent perspectives, hypotheses are
proposed to explain how hierarchical and egalitarian pay
structures impact performance.
Hierarchical Pav Structures
Tournament theory has been widely used to explain the
positive effects of hierarchical pay structures

(Gerhart &

Milkovich, 1992; Milkovich & Newman, 1999). According to

15
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tournament theory, pay structures have motivational
characteristics consistent with their degree of pay
dispersion (Eriksson, 1999; Lazear & Rosen, 1981).
Specifically, as pay dispersion increases, employees become
more competitive and therefore more motivated to
demonstrate those behaviors that move them from their
current to the next pay level (Becker & Huselid,

1992;

Bloom, 1999, Ehrenberg & Bognanno, 1990; Eriksson,

1999;

Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Milkovich & Newman, 1999) . Thus,
hierarchical pay structures positively affect individual
and organizational performance.
Because tournament theory has been widely used to
explain pay structures positive effects, pay structures
have mostly been investigated in tournament like athletic
settings. These settings have been employed because they
conceptually resemble tournaments as proposed in tournament
theory. Prior research has found support for hierarchical
pay structures in these settings. For instance, Ehrenberg
and Bognanno (1990) investigated golfers' individual
performance based upon overall prize levels in golf
tournaments.

Since tournaments' prize structures are

frequently similar, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990)
hypothesized that golfers' performance should be related to
overall prize levels because greater prize money should

16
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lead to proportionate increases in prize differentials
(Knoeber & Thurman, 1994). Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990)
found that as prize levels increased, golfers' performance,
on average, also increased. Similarly, building on the work
of Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990), Becker and Huselid (1992)
investigated performance among automobile race car drivers.
In this study, Becker and Huselid (1992) focused on the
incentive effects of prize differentials associated with
various race finishing positions. Becker and Huselid
(1992)found that these prize differentials have incentive
effects on both individual performance and driver safety
practices

(e.g., wreck less or careless driving habits).

Moreover,

incentive effects were found to peak as prize

differentials became greater.
While positive results such as those of Ehrenberg and
Bognano (1990) and Becker and Huselid (1992) provide
compelling support for hierarchical pay structures, their
findings must be cautiously interpreted. Specifically,
while tournament theory is useful in investigating pay
structures in tournament-like settings, application of the
theory to organizational settings may be questionable
because few organizational settings resemble tournament
environments

(O'Reilly et a l ., 1988).

Moreover, because

these studies were performed in athletic settings, their

17
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generalizability to organizational settings is further
limited (Bloom & Milkovich, 1996; Gerhart & Milkovich,
1992; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994).
Tournament theory suggests a hierarchical system, but
it assumes that people can all compete for higher
positions. However, in business settings, not every
employee is qualified to compete for positions higher up in
the organization. Thus, although there are a number of
notable limitations to tournament theory, it is this
assumption of movement that is most limiting in
organizational settings. Therefore, perspectives on pay
structures that specifically address the idea of individual
qualifications may be more applicable. Moreover, notions
that,(a) people in jobs requiring greater skill should
receive greater pay, and that (b) greater skills are
required at higher organizational levels, seem particularly
supportive of the use of hierarchical pay structures.
Higher earnings should accrue to those who improve
their productivity by investing in themselves through
greater education, training, and experience (Becker, 1975;
Milkovich & Newman, 1999). The value of an individual's
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) is a function of the
time spent developing them (Becker, 1975; Milkovich &
Newman, 1999). Moreover, the skills and time necessary to

18
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gain certain skills restrict individuals' entry into
various occupations (Becker, 1975; Milkovich & Newman,
1999). Thus, people in jobs that require long expensive
training should be paid more than people in jobs that
require less extensive preparation (Milkovich & Newman,
1999).
Different levels of knowledge are required to perform
essential job tasks throughout an organization (Becker,
1975; Milkovich & Newman, 1999). Specifically, greater KSAs
are necessary for effective performance in higher level
positions due to these positions greater sophistication,
complexity, and consequence for organizational performance
(Becker, 1975; Milkovich & Newman, 1999).
Based on the above ideas, organizations with
hierarchical pay structures benefit because employees with
greater KSAs prefer these organizations. Moreover,
employees with high KSAs prefer these organizations because
they pay comparatively more compensation at higher
organizational levels where employees need greater KSAs,.
In short, hierarchical pay structures are useful in both
recruiting and retaining employees with high KSAs to these
organizations

(Livernash, 1957). Thus, in organizations

where significant skill difference requirements exist
between jobs or occupations, hierarchical pay systems will
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yield positive results. However, unlike tournament theory,
this explanation for hierarchical pay structures positive
effects does not rely on the assumption that those at
different levels throughout the organization can all
compete for prize jobs that are associated with higher
levels of compensation.
Egalitarian Pay Structures
In contrast to the positive implications of
hierarchical pay structures, equity theory suggests
potentially dysfunctional consequences of hierarchical pay
structures, and proposes positive consequences as a result
of a more egalitarian pay structures. Specifically, equity
theory suggests that as pay structures become more
hierarchical,

(i.e., less egalitarian), organizational

performance will be adversely influenced because employees
will become both less cooperative and less inclined towards
teamwork (Bloom, 1999; Main et al., 1993).
An important characteristic of exchange processes is
that their consequences have the possibility of being
perceived as just or unjust

(Adams, 1965). Employees

evaluate equity in exchange relationships based upon
comparisons of their inputs and outputs to those of others
involved in similar relationships (Adams, 1965) . When
employees perceive inequity, they may respond with a host
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of potentially negative reactions. Negative reactions
represent a means of restoring equity in the exchange
relationship. Specific negative responses to hierarchical
pay distributions may include decreases in employee
coordination and cooperation which may adversely influence
organizational performance (Adams, 1965; Bloom, 1999;
Pfeffer & Langton,

1993). Illustrating this, Pfeffer and

Langton (1994), in a study of university faculty, found
less research collaboration in academic departments where
wage dispersion was greater. Indeed, hierarchical pay
structures, when seen as unfair by employees, may create a
"trust gap" (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992) . Under these
circumstances, employees may become so disenchanted with
pay differentials that they cease to trust the direction
and guidance of employees at higher organizational levels.
Negative consequences may be further exacerbated if
compensation becomes a means of signaling organizational
value (Bloom, 1999; Folger, 1993). In these cases, more
hierarchical structures may create employee feelings of
social and psychological, as well as economic injustice
(Bloom, 1999; Deutsch, 1985; Folger, 1993). Thus, from an
equity theory perspective, egalitarian pay structures seem
preferable to hierarchical pay structures.
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Bloom (1999) found support for the effectiveness of
egalitarian pay structures. Moreover, Bloom (1999),
supported the precepts of equity theory. Using baseball
teams, Bloom (1999) found that team performance was
negatively related to the degree of hierarchy in teams' pay
structures. Bloom (1999) suggested that, as baseball is a
team game where success is dependent upon effective team
performance, more hierarchical pay distributions may
decrease employees' cooperativeness, and therefore their
teamwork. While Bloom (1999) shares the generalizability
limitations of the earlier athletic based studies, it does
provide a compelling explanation for the use of egalitarian
pay structures.
A Hypothesized Curvilinear Relation between Pay
Distributions' Degree of Hierarchy and Organizational
Performance
Bloom's (1999) finding of a negative linear
relationship between pay distributions' degree of hierarchy
and organizational performance does not forgo the
possibility that the actual relation may be curvilinear.
Equity theory, as mentioned earlier, is based on inputs and
outputs. Thus, variance among employees' KSAs represent
different inputs which, according to equity theory, does
not imply a purely egalitarian system is most preferred.
Rather, just as a purely hierarchical system may be
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perceived as unjust by some employees, a purely egalitarian
system may be perceived as unjust by others.
A curvilinear relation between the degree of hierarchy
in pay distributions and organizational performance is thus
appropriate based upon the positive and negative
consequences of egalitarian and hierarchical pay
distributions. Moreover, the curvilinear relation arguably
occurs because egalitarian pay structures are ineffective
in recruiting and retaining employees with high KSAs while
hierarchical pay distributions are problematic because they
generate employee equity concerns and hinder employees'
cooperation

(Bloom, 1999; Gerhart & Milkovich,

1992;

Pfeffer & Langton, 1994). Taken together, these extremes of
pay dispersion (i.e. highly egalitarian and highly
hierarchical) suggest an optimal level of pay dispersion is
somewhere between these two extremes. Therefore, these
conclusions lead to the following hypotheses regarding the
relationship between pay structures and organizational
performance:
Hypothesis 3. An inverted U shaped relation exists
between pay structures' level of dispersion and
operational indicators of organizational performance.
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Hypothesis 4. An inverted U shaped relation exists
between pay structures' level of dispersion and
financial indicators of organizational performance.
A Hypothesized Interaction between Pav Distributions'
Degree of Hierarchy and Relative Wage Levels
An argument for an interactive relation between
relative wage strategies and pay dispersion has recently
been presented in the compensation literature

(i.e. Bloom

and Michael, in press). So far, this dissertation has
examined the implications of relative wage practices and
pay distributions independently. Indeed, the prior review
suggests that a substantial body of literature is relevant
for such a discussion, and that a gap exists in this area
of compensation research. However, as relative wage levels
and pay distributions are characteristics of any single pay
plan, it may also be important to consider how these
components may influence the effects of each other. Thus, I
now turn to consider the potential interaction between
these characteristics.
Frank's

(1985) work on employees relative standing is

useful in illustrating a potential interaction between
relative wage levels and pay distributions. Frank (1985)
suggests workers may accept perceived inequality when they
are paid above their marginal products. Thus, when pay
structures are hierarchical, high relative wages may negate
24
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lower level employees' feelings of inequity. Similarly,
when pay structures are egalitarian, high relative wages
may lessen the negative impact of low pay dispersion on
employees with high KSAs. However, although the effect of
high relative wages on the performance effects of
egalitarian and hierarchical pay structures will likely be
positive, there is reason to expect that the impact of high
relative wages will be greater when pay structures are
hierarchical than when they are egalitarian. Employee
performance at high organizational levels, or in more
complex (and hence higher paid) jobs, is of greater
organizational consequence

than employee performance at low

organizational levels (i.e., Boudreau et al., 1999; Hunter
& Schmidt,

1983; Hunter Schmidt, & Judiesch, 1990). When

pay is too egalitarian it is these employees who will hold
feelings of inequity. Leading the market, on average for
the organization as a whole, is unlikely to have a notable
effect on the pay level of

these high KSA/importance

employees. In other words,

leading on average by 10% will

probably still lead to top employees being paid under
market in an egalitarian system. On the other hand, when
pay is hierarchical, leading the market may indicate that
the organization values these high KSA/importance employees
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because, under these circumstances, these employees will be
paid above market wages.
Hypothesis 5. The positive effects of relative wage
strategies on operational indicators of organizational
performance will be generated under a hierarchical pay
structure rather than an egalitarian pay structure
Hypothesis 6. The positive effects of relative wage
strategies on financial indicators of organizational
performance will be generated under a hierarchical pay
structure rather than an egalitarian pay structure
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Sample
The sample for this dissertation is 394 short term
stay acute care general hospitals in the state of
California. Hospitals present a valuable opportunity for
studying the organizational performance effects of
compensation practices since over 50 percent of their
expenditures are devoted to salaries and benefits

(American

Hospital Association, 1993; Langland-Orban, Gapenski, &
Vogel, 1996). Short-term stay hospitals are defined as
those facilities with average lengths of stay less than
thirty days (OSHPD, 1991). Acute care general hospitals are
those hospitals that provide a comprehensive range of
services as opposed to those hospitals which provide only
specialized services such as psychiatric care (MacEachern,
1957). Only short-term acute care hospitals are examined so
that the results are not confounded by the different types
of services or clients associated with different hospital
types.
Data is drawn from state mandated (i.e., Chapter 1326,
California statuses of 1984) annual hospital disclosure
reports provided by hospitals to the California Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development

(OSHPD). Through

a system of uniform accounting and reporting procedures,
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California hospitals are required to annually provide
financial disclosure reports to the OSHPD. Hospitals must
provide the reports no later than four months after the end
of their fiscal year. These reports enable the public,
third-party payers, and other interested parties to study
and analyze the financial aspects of hospitals in
California (OSHPD, 1991).

Annual reports from 1991 to 1996

are used in this dissertation.
Although all hospitals in the sample provide the same
types of services, they still vary along several
characteristics. These include size, ownership, and profit
(versus not for profit) status. As is the norm in the
health care field, hospital size is measured using bed
count based measures

(Goes & Parker, 1997). Size is

presented in terms of staffed beds

(Leiyu, 1996).

Ownership considers whether a hospital is privately or
publicly owned. Profit status considers whether the
hospital is a for profit or not for profit venture.

Table

1 lists summary statistics of hospitals in the sample.
Data has been provided by the OSHPD in a CD format.
Supporting documentation used in analyzing the data
included both hard copy and computer generated data guides.
Published research has used these data to investigate
hospital employment trends (e.g., Anderson & Kohn, 1996),
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Table 1
Sample Summary Statistics

1992

1991

Year
Number

Efi

Number

EerceaL

1993
Number

Percent

333

345

1994
Number

Percent

336

1995
Number

PfiXCfiat

319

1996
Number

Percent

339

All Years
Number

Percent

2026

Number of Hospitals

354

Not for Profit

253

71.47%

250

72.46%

236

70.87%

243

72.32%

236

73.98%

233

68.73%

1451

71.62%

For Profit

101

28.53%

95

27.54%

97

29.13%

93

27.68%

83

26.02%

106

31.27%

575

28.38%

Privately Owned

292

82.49%

285

82.61%

286

85.89%

283

84.23%

264

62.76%

268

84 .96%

1698

83.81%

Publicly Owned

62

17.51%

60

17.39%

47

14 .11%

53

15.77%

55

17.24%

51

15.04%

328

16.19%

Average Bed Size

192

182

169

176

175

174

178

vertical integration strategies (e.g., Cody, 1996), and the
relationship between interorganizatioanl links and
innovation (e.g., Goes & Park, 1997). This dissertation
represents the first use of these data in the field of
human resource management, and the first to specifically
examine the pay practices of the hospitals.
Independent Measures
Relative Wage Strategy
Relative wage strategy considers the level of an
organization's average wage relative to the average wages
of other organizations. Organizations that lead the market
pay their employees more than the average wage of other
organizations. Organizations which match the market pay
their employees the average wage of other organizations.
Organizations that lag the market pay their employees less
than the average wage of other organizations. In this
research, organizations' average wages are being determined
using a weighted average of average wages for job
categories through out the hospitals. The data set has job
categories for physicians, nonphysician medical
practitioners, managers and supervisors, technicians and
specialist, registered nurses, licensed vocational nurses,
aides and orderlies, clerical and other administrative
staff, and environmental and food service staff. Weights
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are assigned to each job category based upon the total
number of hours worked by employees in that category.
Relative wage levels are calculated by dividing each
organization's average wage by the average wage of all
other organizations. Degree of either lead or lag of
average market wages is calculated by subtracting 1 from
this value. The resulting value represents each
organization's percentage of either lead or lag of the
average market wage.

Negative values indicate that the

organization lags the market.

A zero value indicates that

the organization matches the market. Positive values
indicate that the organization leads the market.
Pay Dispersion
Gini coefficients are used to capture pay dispersion.
Gini coefficients are widely used in the economics
literature to calculate indices of national income
inequality (Atkinson, 1969; Chakravarty, 1985; Donald &
Weymark, 1980). Recently, management researchers have both
suggested (e.g., Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992) and employed
(e.g., Bloom, 1999) gini coefficients in investigating pay
dispersion.
Gini coefficients may be calculated using individual
or subpopulation level data (Dagum, 1997). When calculated
using subpopulation level data, gini coefficients represent
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a measure of inequality between groups

(Dagum,

1997). In

this research, I will follow the subpopulation approach to
calculating gini coefficients and use average wage values
at the job category level to determine gini coefficients.
Calculated in this manner, the gini coefficients reflect
the average difference between all possible pairs of job
category average wage values expressed as a percent of the
sum of the job category average wage values (Cowell, 1995) .
The gini coefficients represent a measure of dispersion in
the organizations' pay structures because the job
categories used in calculating the gini coefficients
represent categories of employees at different
organizational levels. This facet of the gini coefficients
is fundamental to the dissertation because pay dispersion
between employees at unequal organizational levels is
pivotal to how pay structures influence employee and
therefore organizational performance.
Gini coefficients are calculated based upon a
procedure presented by Cowell

(1995):

Gini coefficient =(2/n2(mean y) ) [y(1|+2y[2]+ 3y[3I+ . ..+ny(nl]((n+1)/n)
where yti] ....

y[n] are the average wages of each

organization's job categories arranged in increasing order
of size,

(mean y) is the mean of the average wages for each
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organization's job categories, and n is the number of job
categories in each organization (Bloom, 1999; Cowell,
1995). Job categories used in calculating gini coefficients
are the same as those used to calculate relative wage
levels. The maximum gini coefficient value of 1 represents
(hypothetically) the greatest degree of pay dispersion or
absolute inequality in the pay distribution (Bloom, 1999).
An example of this would be an organization where the
managers receive all of the compensation and other
employees receive no compensation. The minimum value of
zero represents the lowest degree of pay dispersion or
total equality in the pay distribution (Bloom, 1999). An
example of this would be an organization where all jobs
receive the same level of compensation. The higher an
organization's gini coefficient the more hierarchical their
pay distribution (Bloom, 1999).
Dependent Measures
Previous strategic HRM research has observed that one
challenge in this area is accurately defining and assessing
firm performance measures when they are the dependent
variables of interest (Rogers & Wright, 1999). Moreover,
firm performance is a concept with a substantial number of
possible indicators (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 198 6) .
Important in the selection of firm performance measures in
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HRM research is recognition that HR interventions are
primarily designed to influence HR outcomes, and that their
influence on higher level outcomes will diminish relative
to other factors which are more proximal to these higher
level outcomes

(Rogers & Wright, 1999) . Therefore, when

selecting organizational performance measures it is
imperative that the rationale for the particular measures
be carefully considered.
Average Length of Stay
In this research, I have chosen to evaluate the impact
of relative wage practices and pay structures on
operational and financial indicators of organizational
performance. Since relative wage strategies and pay
structures are expected to influence organizational
efficiency through their effects on employee efficiency,
hospital's average length of stay has been selected as an
operational indicator of organizational performance because
it represents hospitals' efficiency of patient treatment
(Sear, 1992; Thomas, 1997).
Average length of stay (ALOS) is the average length,
measured in days, patients stay in a particular hospital.
Average length of stay has been used as a measure of
performance in previous hospital research (e.g., Phillips,
1999; Sear, 1992; Thomas, 1997) and is often seen as an
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important measure of both treatment quality and efficiency.
Typically, hospitals with low lengths of stay are
considered to be efficient in their use of resources
whereas hospitals with higher lengths of stay are presumed
to be less efficient (Thomas, 1997). Moreover, hospitals
with low lengths of stay have been found to be more
profitable than hospitals with high lengths of stay
(Langland-Orban et al., 1996). Clinical studies in areas
such as cardiac surgery (e.g., Moore, 2000), orthopedic
surgery (e.g., Todara & Schott-Baer, 2000), and psychiatry
(e.g., Tucker & Brems, 1993), to name but a few, have used
length of stay as a measure of treatment quality and
efficiency. Length of stay is calculated by dividing the
total number of patient days by the total number of
discharges

(OSHPD, 1997).

Return on Assets
Return on assets is being selected as a financial
indicator of organizations' performance because it is the
most pervasive measure of organizational firm performance
for strategy studies examining firm performance
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 198 6). Return on assets

(ROA) is

a measure of organizational performance that is widely used
in strategic management (e.g., Brush, Bromiley, & Hendirck,
1999; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Rumelt,
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1991; Schmalensee,

1985), strategic HR research (e.g.,

Gerhart & Mikovich, 1990), and hospital research

(e.g.,

Gardner et al., 1996; Ginn, Young, & Beekun, 1995,
Langland-Orban,

1996). Prior research suggests that ROA is

likely to reflect the degree to which cost-benefit
considerations of HR programs influence organizations'
achievement of their economic goals (Gardiner, Oswald,
Jahera,

&

1996; Ginn et al., 1995; Sear, 1991). ROA reflects

a hospital's ability to both control its expenses and use
its assets to generate income (Lagland-Orban et al, 1996).
Return on assets is calculated as net gain from operations
and interest income divided by total current assets and the
value of plant, property, and equipment (OSHPD, 1998).
Control Variables
Consistent with earlier research hospital ownership,
size, and profit status will be controlled for in this
research (Goes & Park, 1997).
Ownership
Ownership considers whether a hospital is privately or
publicly owned. Private or public ownership may influence
the hospitals' values for the dependent variables

(Eennell

& Alexander, 1987; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991, Sear, 1991) .
For example, because indigent patients account for a
greater proportion of the care given in public hospitals,
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these organizations' efficiency and profits may be
adversely influenced (Goes & Park, 1997). Efficiency is
lessened because indigent patients are more likely to be
acutely ill because they forgo treatment until seriously in
need (Billings, Zeitel, Lukomnik, & Carey, 1993).
Consequently, when they receive treatment they are sicker
and require greater care than non indigent patients
(Billings et al., 1993).

Furthermore, because public

hospitals treat more indigent patients, their financial
performance will be lower than privately owned facilities
where greater revenues are received for services rendered
(Gardiner et al., 1996; Phillips, 1999).
Hospital Size
Hospital size may also explain differences in the
dependent variables (Beekun et a l ., 1998; Gardiner et al.,
1996; Leiyu, 1996; Sear, 1992). Gardiner et al.(1996)
observe that "organizational theory would suggest that
hospital size and sophistication of services have a
positive relationship with performance"

(p.443).

Furthermore, in a study of U.S. hospitals, Beekun et al.
(1998) note that size is a well established indicator of an
organization's financial and managerial resources. Larger
hospitals outperform smaller hospitals because they can
take advantage of scale economies associated with their
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size (Freeh & Mobley, 1995). Hospital size may further
influence organizational performance because larger
hospitals may be more innovative (Goes & Park, 1997).
Examples of hospital innovation include the timely
introduction of new technologies (e.g., laser surgery,
fiberoptic endoscopy, magnetic resonance imaging) and
administrative services (e.g., home hospice care, in-house
and freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, adult daycare
health centers) advances

(Goes & Park, 1997). The size

measure that will be used as a control variable is staffed
beds, which is a common measure of hospital size (Leiyu,
1996).
Profit Status
Profit and non-profit status may also affect
differences among the hospitals on the dependent variables
(Phillips, 1999; Sear, 1992; Sear, 1991). For instance,
Sear (1991) in a study of Florida hospitals,

found that

for-profit hospitals were both more efficient and more
profitable than not for-profit hospitals.

Even though

industry-wide competitive and regulatory pressures have
brought about a convergence of profit and non-profit
hospitals' goals, differences in profit and non-profit
hospitals still remain which may influence their
performance (Beekun et al., 1998; Phillips, 1999). For
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example, Ginn et al.

(1995) observe that hospitals'

financial structures may differ depending upon their profit
status. One illustration of the potential impact of this is
that while for-profit hospitals can issue stock to raise
additional funds, non-profit hospitals cannot

(Ginn et al.,

1995). Another explanation for performance differences
between profit and non-profit hospitals is that non-profit
hospitals may be less innovative than for profit hospitals
(Goes & Park, 1997). Innovation may be an important source
of competitive advantage for investor owned hospitals
because possessing the latest technologies and services may
bring greater status and legitimacy to these institutions
(Goes & Park, 1997).
Statistical Analysis Technique
Several statistical techniques are potentially useful
in evaluating pooled longitudinal cross sectional data.
These include ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
least squares dummy variable (LSDV) models, and random
effects panel data techniques. OLS regression has been
chosen as the primary means of analysis. OLS is being used
because it addresses the overall effects of each of the
compensation practices being considered. Specifically, OLS
is the most appropriate technique for hierarchically
investigating the effect of particular independent
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variables, although other techniques have characteristics
that make them superior to OLS regression in certain
circumstances

(Sayrs, 1989). The next paragraphs discuss

the benefits and limitations of each technique and present
the rationale for performing further LSDV analyses in
addition to the primary OLS analyses.
LSDV models use dummy variables to represent
unobserved firm specific effects among cross-sectional
units

(Hsiao, 1986). Specifically, LSDV models capture

differences across cross-sections with a dummy variable
defined intercept for each cross-section (Maddala, 1987;
Sayrs, 1989). In comparison to OLS regression, LSDV models
have the unique advantage of being able to control for
unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity across firms by
allowing the intercept of the testing model to vary for
each firm (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). Thus, LSDV models are
potentially superior to standard constant coefficient OLS
regression models because constant coefficient models do
not adequately allow for differences across cross sectional
units (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1985) .
When cross sections are pooled using constant coefficient
models, unobservable cross-sectional unit heterogeneity
effects are placed in the disturbance term with variance
due to other unmeasured effects (Conyon & Peck, 1998). The
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presence of these effects in the disturbance term may lead
to substantial heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term
(Sayrs, 1989) . The effects of heteroscedasticity in the
disturbance term are compounded by the pooling of data
which, while increasing sample size, also increases the
contribution of firm heterogeneity to the disturbance term
(Sayrs, 1989). Consequences of increased firm heterogeneity
in the disturbance term include the generation of
inefficient and potentially meaningless regression
coefficients

(Conyon & Peck, 1998; Murphy, 1985; Sayrs,

1989). Specifically, because heteroscedasticity increases
error variances, it reduces the power of significance tests
(Bobko, 1995) .
The primary disadvantage of LSDV, though, is that it
requires substantial sample sizes. Specifically, to capture
firm specific effects, LSDV analyses use dummy variables
unique to each firm in a pool. These dummy variables
require

substantial degrees of freedom (Maddala, 1987).

Furthermore, another limitation of LSDV is that it is
impossible to separate the effects of factors which remain
constant over time from the dummy variables (Judge et al.,
1985). In this research, it is unclear how extensively
compensation practices change over time. Thus, if firms'
compensation practices remain constant over time their true
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effects may be difficult to appraise in LSDV analyses.
Moreover, under these circumstances, it is possible that
many of the effects attributable to compensation practices
may be subsumed by the dummy variables in LSDV models
(Maddala, 1987).
Fixed effects LSDV models also presume that
differences between firms are fixed as opposed to random in
nature. A fixed effects approach is appropriate when
inferences will apply only to cross sectional units in a
sample (Huselid & Becker, 1996). Random effects are more
appropriate when inferences will extend to observations
outside the sample (Huselid & Becker, 1996; Maddala,

1987).

Thus, initially, a random effects approach seems useful in
this research. However, random effects models should not be
used when differences captured by dummy variables in a
fixed effects model are likely due to characteristics of
the firms rather than random variation among the firms
(Judge et a l ., 1985). Hausman tests are used to evaluate
the applicability of the random effects approach (Hausman,
1978). Specifically, Hausman tests evaluate the degree to
which firm effects are likely correlated with variables
under consideration and the extent to which this is likely
to influence the results of random effects models (Hausman,
1978) . Hausman tests performed in the process of this
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research indicated that fixed effects were more appropriate
than random effects.

Given both the nature of the present

sample (i.e., the possibility that the firm dummy variables
were likely some function of unmeasured hospital
characteristics), and the results of the Hausman tests, the
fixed effects approach is preferable to the random effects
approach in evaluating this dissertation's research
questions

(Huselid & Becker 1995). Therefore, in addition

to the primary OLS regressions, secondary LSDV analyses
have also been performed.
Procedure
Pooled longitudinal cross sections composed of an
unbalanced panel data sample of 394 California hospitals
were used to test the hypotheses. All variables were
investigated for potential outlying values

(Orr, Sackett,

&

Dubois, 1991). Initially, using scatter plots of the data,
values many standard deviations from the mean were visually
eliminated (Netar et al., 1989). Following this, remaining
values greater than three standard deviations from the mean
of the remaining data were also eliminated. Approximately
eight percent of the data was excluded due to outlying
values. A qualitative review of these cases seemed to
indicate that they may have been mis-codings or
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inappropriate classifications

(i.e., not acute care), and

so were eliminated to ensure an accurate sample.
To investigate causality, compensate for effect lags,
and consider policy implications all hypothesis were tested
using dependent variables at time (t) one time period after
independent variables at time {t—1)(Cook & Campbell,

1979;

Huselid & Becker, 1996; Kerlinger, 1986; Rogers & Wright,
1999). A lag of one year has been used in previous research
investigating the performance implications of compensation
practices (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Dynamic models
(i.e., models with lagged dependent variables) were not
employed because dependent variables were expected to be
influenced by values of the independent variables in prior
periods

(Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990).

Two hierarchical OLS regression models and two LSDV
models were estimated to test the hypotheses. The first
model of each type was used to test hypothesis 1,
hypothesis 3, and hypothesis 5. The dependent variable for
these models was the ALOS operational measure of
organizational performance. The independent variable of
interest for hypothesis 1 was the relative wage strategy
measure. The independent variable of interest for
hypothesis 3 was the curvilinear pay dispersion term (i.e.,
the gini coefficient squared). The independent variable of
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interest for hypothesis 5 was the relative wage level pay
dispersion interaction term (i.e., relative wage level
times gini coefficient). The second model of each type
estimated was used to test hypothesis 2, hypothesis 4, and
hypothesis 6. The dependent variable for these models was
the ROA financial measure of organizational performance.
The independent variable of interest for hypothesis 2 was
the curvilinear relative wage strategy term (i.e., relative
wage strategy squared). The independent variable of
interest for hypothesis 4 was the curvilinear pay
dispersion term (i.e., gini coefficient squared). The
independent variable of interest for hypothesis 6 was the
relative wage level pay dispersion interaction term (i.e.,
relative wage level times gini coefficient).
The variables of hospital size, hospital ownership,
and hospital profit status were controlled for in all
models. Additionally, a dummy variable for each of the
longitudinal years of data was included to control for
unobserved year effects by comparing each year to the base
year 1996. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and
correlations for all study variables.
Variables were entered into OLS models hierarchically
following a procedure established by Cortina(1993) for the
simultaneous investigation of interactions and curvilinear
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients
Mean
1. Hospital Size

178.75 130.05

2. Organizational Relative
Wage Strategy

0.01

0.15

3. Organizational Gini Coefficient

0.22

0.03

4. Return on Assets

6.06

12.87

5. Average Length of Stay

5.72

2 .78

N= 2026
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
cr»

SD

2
.31***

3
.07**

4

5

. 11***

.07**

-.22***

-0. 01

-.17***

.05*

1***
-0.03

relations. In the first step, the time dummy and control
variables were entered into the models. Next, the relative
wage level and pay dispersion main effects were entered.
Following this, the relative wage level and pay dispersion
quadratic terms were entered into the models. Lastly, the
pay dispersion relative wage level interaction term was
entered into the models. All variables were entered into
LSDV models simultaneously since LSDV analysis in general,
and hierarchical LSDV analysis in particular, will be
ineffective if variables are time invariant (Judge et al.,
1985; Maddala, 1987). In this research, the degree to which
the compensation practices under consideration are time
invariant is unclear.
Models were investigated for potential violations of
relevant assumptions including heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation

(Maddala, 1987; Sayrs, 1989).

Heteroscedasticity is likely present in the OLS models due
to the effects of cross sectional pooling (Sayrs, 1989).
Secondary LSDV analyses specifically address this
heteroscedasticity by introducing firm effects

(Sayrs,

1989). However, in these analyses (i.e., LSDV), plots of
residuals versus predicted values when ALOS was the
dependent variable reveled non-constant error variances as
predicted values of this variable increased (Kvanli,
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Guynes,

& Pavur, 1989). This heteroscedasticity was

compensated for by performing a log transformation on ALOS
(Netar et a l ., 1989). Thus, a log transformed ALOS variable
is used throughout this research.
Heteroscedasticity in the OLS models also made tests
of autocorrelation using the generally accepted Durbin
Watson tests inappropriate (Sayrs, 1989). Specifically,
Durbin Watson auto correlation tests presuppose
homoscedasticity rather than heteroscedasticity (Sayrs,
1989). However, to further investigate autocorrelation,
Durbin Watson statistics are reported for the LSDV models.
Because Durbin Watson tests with large sample sizes and
multiple variables require significant computer resources,
all Durbin Watson statistics for organizational level
models were evaluated using a baseline Durbin Watson dL
value of 1.98 for N=2026 with 400 variables at a pc.OOl
significance level (Savin and White, 1977). Based on this
value, all models demonstrated appropriate Durbin Watson
values. Thus, this suggests the effects of autocorrelation
were minimal.

48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHASTER FOUR: RESULTS
Hypothesis 1
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models for
hypothesis 1. Table 4 presents the results for the LSDV
analysis for hypothesis 1. Both analyses lend support to
hypothesis 1 which predicted that relative wage levels will
be positively related to operational indicators of
performance. Importantly, the OLS analysis demonstrates the
potential impact of compensation practices on operational
indicators of organizational performance in that relative
wage practices and pay structures are found to explain over
4% of the variance in ALOS.
In both analyses, the relation between the
organizational relative wage level measure and the
transformed operational measures of organizational
performance, ALOS, is significant and in the hypothesized
direction. Lower ALOS is indicative of increased
organizational performance. Thus, a negative relation
between the relative wage level measure and ALOS supports
hypothesis 1. However, because the models used for analyses
also include an interaction effect between relative wage
practices and pay structures, relative wage practice main
effects can not be accurately interpreted (Aiken & West,
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Table 3
Summary of Results for the Hierarchical OLS Regression between
Organizations' Relative Wage Strategies. Pav Dispersion, the Relative
Wage Strategy Pay Dispersion Interaction, and
Average Length of Stay
Step One

Step One

Profit

Status

Ownership
Si z e

Step Two

Step Three

S t e p Pour

••••p < .001

.036
12*•••

1 0....

2 l*«*«

.24"*

.24*•••

.062"*

.065**

.075""■•

• .13****

-.15*••*

-.15""

.0006

• .02

.14*"*"

.11""

- .093••••

Overall R Squared
C h a n g e in R S q u a r e d

0 07

0.09

0.11

0 .07

0.02

0.02

0.01

Adjusted R Squared

0. 0 7

0.09

0.01

0.11

1B . 6 8 9 0 * * * -

20.3394****

20.44 06 *•••

20.3176-***

20 2 6

202 6

2026

2026

S t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s a r e shown.
I n c l u d e s a t i m e e f f e c t w h i c h is n o t shown.

•fi< .i

.034
.11 •••■

* Pay Dispersion

F - v a l u e of M o d e l

• * B < .05
• ■ * p * .01

.04 3 •

Squared

N
Mote:
Model

Fou r

.14""

Relative Wage Strategy Squared

Relative Wage strategy

Step

.048 • •

Relative Wage Strategy

Gini C o e f ficient
Overall

Step Three

,16'»"

Gini Coefficient
Overall

Step Two

0.12
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Table 4
Summary of LSDV Analysis for the Relation between
Organizations' Relative Wage Strategies. Pay Dispersion,
the Relative Wage Strategy Pav Dispersion Interaction,
and Indicators of Organizational Performance
Average Length of Stay

Return on Assets

S t d . Beta

Std. Beta

.061*

- .13

.056

- .23**

.103**

.097

-.12****

-.035*

.016

.025

.0014

.0093

Gini Coefficient Squared

-.029**

-.052**

Relative Wage * Pay Dispersion

-.032**

.050*

Dependent Variable
Independent Variable
Organizational
Control Variables

Profit Status
Ownership
Size

Pay Policy
Variables

Relative Wage Level
Qini

Pay Policy
Curvilinear Terms

Interaction

Relative Wage Level Squared

Overall R squared
Adjusted R squared

0.91
0.89

0.53
0.41

F-value of model

42.9452****

Hausman test

50.52****

25.63**

Durbin Watson

1.762****

1.9666****

N

2026

4.5535****

2026

Not-e. P-value - 12.7258**** for inclusion of firm effect in model where Average Length of Stay is the dependent variable.
P-value - 4.4133**** for inclusion of firm effect in model where Return on Assets is the dependent variable.
Standardized regression coefficients are shown.
Models include both firm and time effects which are not shown.

*p < .1
**p <

.05

• **p < .01
****p < .001

1991). I will thus interpret this finding below after
discussing the results for H 5 .
Hypothesis 2
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS models for
hypothesis 2. Table 4 presents the results for the LSDV
analysis for hypothesis 2. Statistical results find little
support for hypothesis 2, which predicted that there would
be an inverted U shaped relation between organizations'
overall relative wage strategies and the ROA financial
measure of organizational performance. In the OLS analysis,
the relation between the relative wage quadratic term and
ROA was in the hypothesized direction but not significant.
However, in the LSDV analyses the relation between the
relative wage quadratic term and ROA was not in the
hypothesized direction or significant.
Hypothesis 3
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS model for
hypothesis 3. Table 4 presents the results of the LSDV
analysis for hypothesis 3. Statistical results yield little
support for hypothesis 3, which predicted that there would
be an inverted U shaped relation between organizational
measures of pay dispersion and operational measures of
organizational performance. OLS results were opposite the
hypothesized direction and not significant while LSDV
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OLS Regression between Organizations'
Wage Strategies.

Pay Dispersion,

Pav Dispersion Interaction,

Step One

Profit

Status

Gini

Gini

Relative Wage

Coefficient

Overall

Step

Pour

Relative

Relative

Change

Wage
R

in

-.0094

- .0099

P-value of

.094•*••
.13**••

Strategy

Strategy

.0086
103*-»*
.13'*1*

Step

- .0097

.1 3 * * * *

.03 0 *

.029

- .0 2 0

- .0 1 2

-.012

Squared

Four

.097*

.033

Squared
Wage

Seep Three

- .032

-.011

- .024

-.0032

* Pay D i s p e r s i o n

.0 0 9 * * • *

Squared

0.02

0.03

0.03

R

0.02

0 .01

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.02

0.02

S.0630****

5 .0 5 9 6 * * * *

4 . 5162****

5 .2 6 9 3 * • * *

2026

2026

2026

2026

Squared
Squared
Model

N
S t a n d a r d i z e d r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s a r e shown.
i n c l u d e s a t i m e e f f e c t w h i c h is not shown.

O

R

Strategy

Two

O

Adjusted

* p < .1
• * p < .05
* * * p < .01
• • • • p < .001

Step

r»1
O

Overall

Hotei
Model

Step One

Coefficient

Overall

Step Three

and Return on Assets

.1 3 - * * *

Size

Step Two

the Relative Wage Strategy

.097*•••

Ownership

Relative

O
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Table 5
Summary of Results for the Hierarchical

results were significant but opposite the hypothesized
direction.
Hypothesis 4
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS models for
hypothesis 4. Table 4 presents the results for the LSDV
analysis for hypothesis 4. Study results yield partial
support for hypothesis 4, which predicted that there would
be an inverted (J shaped relation between pay dispersion and
financial indicators of organizational performance. Results
of the OLS regression, while in the hypothesized direction,
were not significant. However, in the LSDV analyses, the
relation between the pay dispersion quadratic term and ROA
was in the hypothesized direction and significant.
Hypothesis 5
Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models for
hypothesis 5. Table 4 presents the results of the LSDV
analysis for hypothesis 5. Both the OLS and the LSDV
results support hypothesis 5, which predicted that
organizations' relative wage strategies would interact with
their degree of pay dispersion to influence ALOS.
Specifically, high relative wages were hypothesized to
positively influence the relation between pay dispersion
and ALOS.
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Figure 1 plots the relation between relative wage
practices and ALOS for high and low levels of pay
dispersion. Figure 1 indicates that for each of these
levels of pay dispersion, as relative wage levels increase,
ALOS is generally positively affected. Thus, in addition to
lending support to hypothesis 5, these results also provide
graphical support for hypothesis 1.
Figure 2 portrays the interaction between
organizations' relative wage strategies and their degrees
of pay dispersion and its effect on ALOS.

The nature of

the interaction is determined by plotting separate lines
for high, low, and average relative wage levels. Low
relative wages are represented by a lag relative wage
strategy one standard deviation below the mean relative
wage level. High relative wages are represented by a lead
relative wage strategy one standard deviation above the
mean relative wage level. Average relative wages are
represented by a match relative wage strategy equal to the
mean relative wage level. Figure 2 indicates that when
relative wages are high, pay dispersion positively
influences ALOS whereas, when relative wages are low, pay
dispersion negatively influences ALOS.
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Hypothesis 6
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS model for
hypothesis 6. Table 4 presents the results of the LSDV
analysis for hypothesis 6. Both OLS and LSDV analyses
support hypothesis 6, which predicted that organizations'
relative wage strategies would interact with their degrees
of pay dispersion to influence ROA. Specifically, high
relative wages were hypothesized to positively influence
the relation between pay dispersion and ROA. Figure 3 plots
the relation between relative wage practices and ROA for
high and low levels of pay dispersion. Figure 3
demonstrates the hypothesized interaction between
organizations'

relative wage strategies and organizations'

degrees of pay dispersion. Figure 4 portrays the effect of
the interaction between organizations'

relative wage

strategies and organizations' degrees of pay dispersion on
the relation between pay dispersion and ROA. Again, the
nature of the interaction is determined by plotting
separate lines for the relation between pay dispersion and
ROA for low, high, and average relative wage levels. Figure
4 indicates that when relative wages are high, pay
dispersion positively influences ROA whereas, when relative
wages are low, pay dispersion negatively influences ROA.
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Table 6
Summary of Hypotheses
Results

Relationship

Result

1

Organizations' relative wage levels will be
positively related to operational indicators
of organizational performance.

Supported

2

An inverted U-shaped relation exists between
organizational level relative wage strategies
and financial indicators of organizational
performance.

Not Supported

3

An inverted U-shaped relation exists between
pay structures level of dispersion and
operational indicators of organizational
performance.

Not Supported

4

An inverted U-shaped relation exists between
pay structures level of dispersion and
financial indicators of organizational
performance.

Not Supported

5

The positive effects of relative wage strategies
on operational indicators of organizational
performance will be generated under a hierarchical
pay structure rather than an egalitarian
pay structure.

Supported

6

The positive effects of relative wage strategies
on financial indicators of organizational
performance will be generated under a hierarchical
pay structure rather than an egalitarian
pay structure.

Supported

Hypothesis

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
Answers to Research Questions
This dissertation has sought to investigate the
organizational performance implications of pay structures
and relative wage rates.

Specifically, it has focused on

these implications in terms of operational and financial
indicators of organizational performance. Statistical
results suggest that relative wage practices and pay
structures influence organizational performance in these
areas. Perhaps most noteworthy, results indicate that
relative wage practices and pay structures interact to
affect these areas of organizational performance.
As suggested by hypothesis 1, the relation between
relative wage practices and operational measures of
performance appears to be positive as hypothesized. This
result must be interpreted cautiously since main effects
may be misleading in models with interactive effects

(Aiken

& West, 1991). However, the previous caveat not
withstanding, plots of the data generally indicate that
relative wage practices have a positive effect on
operational measures of organizational performance. Thus,
lending support to hypothesis 1, a positive relation
appears to exist between organizations' relative wage
practices and ALOS. Although there are curvilinear and

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interactive effects whose influence must be considered,
hospitals which pay above average relative wages do seem to
have shorter patient lengths of stay (ALOS) than hospitals
with lower pay levels.
Limited statistical results for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4
suggests that the actual relations may be other than those
hypothesized. One scenario is that, as proposed by
hypotheses 5 and 6, relative wage levels and pay dispersion
may interact to influence the relations hypothesized.
Importantly, Cortina (1993) has observed that curvilinear
and interaction effects are both very similar and easily
confused. Moreover, Cortina (1993) suggests the importance
of simultaneously investigating both curvilinear and
interaction effects. Thus, incongruent results for these
hypotheses

(i.e., hypotheses 2, 3, and 4) may be due to

interactive effects such as those proposed by hypotheses 5
and 6 (i.e., an interaction between relative wage levels
and pay dispersion).

Indeed, as Bedeian and Mossholder

(1994) point out, "a significant interaction term suggests
that two or more lines fit the data better than a single
regression line."

(P.162) This is illustrated by figures 1,

2, 3, and 4. Specifically, these figures demonstrate that
the nature of the relevant curvilinear relations depends
upon the level of the compensation practice which is not
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being directly investigated. Thus, the findings associated
with hypotheses 5 and 6 must be discussed as a potential
explanation for hypotheses 2, 3, and 4's mixed results.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 investigated the interaction
between relative wage levels and pay dispersion and its
effect on the relation between pay dispersion and ALOS
(hypothesis 5) and ROA (hypothesis 6). Hypotheses 5 and 6
were supported in both the OLS and the LSDV analyses.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 represent simultaneous investigations of
the impact of relative wage levels and pay structures.
Support for these hypotheses asserts the importance of
concurrently considering relative wage strategy and pay
structure decisions. In fact, the interactions most
probably explain the mixed results for the previous
hypotheses. Thus, relative wage strategies, it seems, do
influence the organizational performance effects of pay
structure decisions. Results suggest that high relative
wages are preferable when pay dispersion is high, while low
relative wages are preferable when pay dispersion is low.
Moreover, if given a choice, it seems organizations should
pursue a strategy of either high relative wages and
hierarchical pay structure or low relative wages and
egalitarian pay structures. As illustrated in figures 2 and
4, these relative wage strategy/pay structure combinations
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generally appear tc most positively affect organizational
performance.
Findings that high relative wages and hierarchical pay
structures positively affect organizations' performance are
consistent with observations by Bloom and Michael (in
press) that high relative wages potentially lessen the
negative effects of hierarchical pay structures.
Specifically, Bloom and Michael (in press) propose that
high relative wages limit hierarchical pay structures'
adverse effects on employees' cooperation and coordination.
Moreover, they suggest employees will tolerate significant
pay dispersion so long as they receive wages that exceed
their marginal products

(Bloom & Michael, in press; Frank,

1985) . Thus, while hierarchical pay distributions may
decrease employees' coordination and cooperation, the
simultaneous application of high relative wages appears to
counteract these effects.
Results also indicate that a combination of low
relative wages and egalitarian pay structures may
positively affect organizations' performance. Deci's (1975)
work on intrinsic motivation may be useful in interpreting
this finding. Specifically, as previously proposed,
egalitarian structures

(i.e., under those circumstances

where significant differences exist in skill requirements

65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

across job categories) and low relative wages are expected
to be ineffective compensation practices. Moreover, because
low relative wages and egalitarian structures are
potentially ineffective compensation practices, employees
in organizations with these characteristics

(i.e. low

relative wages and egalitarian pay structures) must be
influenced by these compensation practices differently than
hypothesized. One explanation is that these compensation
practices have characteristics that are supportive of
employees' intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is a
particularly relevant explanation because, like egalitarian
pay structures, it is often discussed in the context of
environments which require coordination and cooperation.
The concept of participative management is useful to
illustrate this. Specifically, participative management
concepts are recognized both for the employee coordination
and cooperation they require, as well as for their
contributions to employees' intrinsic motivation
1975).

(Deci,

Thus, to the extent that egalitarian pay structures

create an environment of employee cooperation and
coordination they foster intrinsic motivation.
Furthermore, research has found that intrinsic motivation
decreases when employees are paid high relative wages for
instrumental reasons such as those proposed by efficiency
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wage.theory (Deci, 1975). Therefore, while egalitarian pay
structures may foster an environment in which intrinsic
motivation is maximized, intrinsic motivation is
simultaneously lessened if employees are paid high relative
wages for purely instrumental purposes. Thus, egalitarian
pay structures, while useful in fostering intrinsic
motivation when relative wages are low, are ineffective in
fostering intrinsic motivation when relative wages are
high. This potentially explains why egalitarian pay
structures and low relative wage levels positively
influence organizational performance.
Hospital size appears to be one characteristic that
distinguishes hospitals that pursue combinations of either
high relative wages and hierarchical pay distributions or
low relative wages and egalitarian pay distributions.
Indeed, based on a visual review of the data, larger
hospitals appear to more frequently use the combination of
high relative wages and hierarchical pay distributions
whereas, smaller hospitals seem to more frequently use the
combination of low relative wages and egalitarian pay
structures. While the potential interpretations of this
finding are numerous, one explanation is that it represents
some shared understanding among particular size hospitals
of optimal compensation practices (i.e., relative wage
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practices and pay structures).

Moreover, it could reflect

the process whereby firms identify and mimic other firms'
sources of competitive advantage (Wright et al., 1994).
Thus, it may suggest that hospitals recognize particular
combinations of relative wage levels and pay distributions
as sources of HRM based competitive advantage (Wright et
al., 1994) .
Limitations
Limitations of this research include generalizability
issues associated with both the sample and the method of
calculating organizational pay dispersion. A sample of
hospitals is undoubtably a unique sample. Differences
between hospitals and other organizations include that
hospitals are highly labor intensive organizations
(Langland-Orban et al., 1996). Furthermore, due to recent
financial constraints in hospitals which have yielded a
less skilled mix of employees than in past, many employees
important to a hospital's success are now located at lower
organizational levels (Langland-Orban et al., 1996). This
likely made the dissertation's dependent variables more
susceptible to the effect of relative wage practices and
pay dispersion at lower organizational levels.
Another of the dissertation's limitations is the
technique whereby organizational pay dispersion was
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approximated. Optimally, a pay dispersion measure would
consider all of an organization's employees. Regrettably,
the realities of data collection make getting this type of
data from a sizable enough sample of organizations nearly
impossible.

Thus, this dissertation has used

organizations' average wage values for hierarchically
unequal job categories in calculating pay dispersion.
Moreover, job categories are based upon employee skill
requirements for each job category. While this is a
potentially meaningful way of viewing hierarchies of
organizational members, it may not be applicable to all
organizations. Specifically, some hierarchies may be better
conceptualized based upon authority rather than skill
differences. Thus, the results of this dissertation may be
more appropriate to those situations where hierarchies of
organizational members are best viewed based upon skill
rather than authority differences.
Calculating pay dispersion with job category level
data also neglects differences in pay that occur within
particular job categories. Thus, any differences in pay
within specific job categories are excluded. Consequently,
pay dispersion, as considered in this dissertation, does
not capture the potentially significant dispersion which
occurs within various job categories. While pay dispersion
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between job categories is important in its own right, pay
dispersion within job categories may be both meaningful and
significant. Pay dispersion within job categories is
particularly relevant in light of the potential costs and
difficulties

(e.g., differences in skill requirements

across job categories in some organizations) associated
with moving between job categories. Were it possible to
include this within job category pay dispersion different
theories might be tested. Most notably, the precepts of
tournament theory might be applicable as employees would be
able to compete against each other within a job type for
pay increases.
Directions for Future Research
Areas for future research include further
consideration of the effects of relative wage levels and
pay dispersion on organizational performance in different
settings with other measures. Specifically, future research
which alleviates the limitations of the current research
setting and pay dispersion measures would be beneficial.
For instance, it might be valuable to investigate pay
dispersion in settings where the importance of employee
cooperation varies. Negative organizational effects of
hierarchical pay distributions occur because increased pay
dispersion adversely affects employees' cooperativeness.
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Thus, the negative effects of hierarchical pay
distributions may depend upon the level of cooperation
necessary in a particular setting. Research could also
investigate the micro level influences of employees'
cooperativeness on the organizational effectiveness of
particular pay structures. Moreover, research could also
consider the impact of particular levels of pay dispersion
on employee job attitudes. Finally, opportunities where pay
dispersion could be calculated using all employees might be
valuable in further investigating the organizational
performance effects of pay dispersion.
Consideration of the organizational performance
effects of relative wage strategies and pay structures in
international settings might also prove a useful area for
future research. The United States is among the most
individualistic of all societies. Research suggests that
human resource practices which work in individualistic
societies may be less effective in more collective society
(Hofstede, 1984). Specifically, compensation practices
which directly reward individual performance and
achievement may be offensive to members of collective
societies. This is particularly the case when these
collectivistic societies value more paternalistic factors
such as employee tenure or overall group harmony in
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determining individual compensation (Beatty, McCune,&
Beatty, 1988) . Thus, one area for future research would be
to evaluate the effectiveness of relative wage strategies
and pay structures depending upon a country's level of
individualism.
Another valuable area for future research may be
consideration of the organizational performance impact of
other strategic human resource management practices.
Investigations of the impact of strategic practices in the
areas of staffing and training might further elucidate the
organizational effect of strategic human resource
management practices. Particularly useful would be
consideration of the coordination between these practices
and compensation practices, and the effect of this
coordination on organizational performance (MacDuffie,
1995). Also useful would be consideration of the
performance implications of strategic human resource
management practices fit with the overall strategy of the
organization.
Conclusion
In sum, this research makes an important step in
describing how compensation practices are related to
organizations' operational and financial performance.
However, we are far from understanding how the whole of HRM
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impacts organizations' performance. Thus, research into the
organizational performance effects of compensation and
other HRM practices must continue.
The California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development deserves credit for making available
information that allows researchers to examine HR
practices' effects over many organizations and many years.
Hopefully, more such data opportunities will be made
available, and research will take advantage of such
opportunities to advance the field's understanding of how
HRM impacts the strategic functions of organizations.
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